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Abstract 
' 
-
This paper focuses on uncovering the ideological 
consequences of the role that idealism plays 
• in 
reproducing a certain type of culture under capitalism. I
 
begin with a theoretical introduction that seeks to
 
establish the value of 
• 
marx1sm and deconstruction 
• in 
highlighting the real nature of idealism, then I turn my 
attention to an analysis of the specific limitations an
d 
contradictions of the arguments of two influentia
l 
idealist thinkers, E.D.Hirsch and Allan Bloom, in the
 
process explaining the need for materialist intellectuals
 
to engage with, and overtly align themselves within, the
 
process of ideological struggle in our culture. 
· After this, I go on to suggest that in the 
humanities the freshman composition class 
• is the • prime 
site of the reproduction of idealist thinking and that
 
freshman anthologies are instrumental in the continuatio
n 
of this process. As an example, I analyse in detail the
 
freshman anthology that we have used over the past four
 
years at Lehigh, to show the sort of damage done to the
 
1 
historically constituted substance of the very ideas of 
the canon it promotes. In conclusion I question the 
ideological role of the teaching of persuasive rhetoric, 
and attempt to suggest its connection with the role played 
by idealist thought, a connection which needs to be 
analysed in greater detail outside the immediate scope of 
this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
Idealism and Ideology: 
The Limitations and Politics of Idealism 
''Things that have a constitution in themselves'' 
-- a dogmatic idea with which one must 
break absolutely. 
Nietzsche, The Will to Power 
To begin with a definition: a metaphysical (or 
idealist) philosophy is an account of the world and the 
''human condition" which is concerned with unc.overing what 
it claims to be the "essential nature'' of things, and 
concerned with articulating this I uncovering --· its 
''philosophical" account of things -- I 1n a pure, 
speculative language. Metaphysical philosophies therefore 
attempt to describe us, and our world, in empirical, 
rationalistic terms, terms which metaphysicians claim can 
(and must) be axiomatic and free from the ''distortions'' of 
history and ideology in order to present an ''objective'' 
and "universally true" account of how things "really are'' 
· ·, and wha_t they "really mean.'' In this chapter, I hope to 
show how mariism and deconstruction together offer 
3· 
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critiques of metaphysics that demonstrate precisely how 
false its account of the world is. 
In his book, Marxism and Deconstruction, Michael Ryan 
claims that Derrida shows metaphysics to be "not a 
historically periodizable school of thought; it • 1s, 
rather, a permanent function of a kind of thinking which 
overlooks (that is, theorizes away) its own historicity, 
differentiality, materiality (its anchoring • in and 
among other things)" • lS this (p.117). It language, 
overlooking of its own anchoring in language which 
constitutes metaphysic's major problem from the point of 
view of deconstruction, its logocentrism, from which it is 
able to develop an essentializing, idealistic account of 
human intellection as a self-enclosed process, independent 
of specific material and cultural actualities. This 
account is easily exploded, for, as Marx has shown in The 
German Ideology, it does not require deep intuition to 
comprehend that ''man's ideas, views and concept ions, in 
one word, man's consciousness, changes with every change 
in the conditions of his material existence, in his social 
relations and in his social life" (Selected Writings, 
p.102). Consequently, from ·the perspectives of both 
deconstruction and marxism, when metaphysical thinkers, in 
(, 
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·, 
their attempts to account for 
l 
Man and World in his 
essentialist terms, come to talk of thought and the 
processes of thinking as things that have a constitution 
"in themselves,'' they fail to acknowledge, or actively 
suppress, the possibility that "the'' meaning or value of a 
concept, relation, or thing depends on the interests of 
specific human agents, or specific groups of agents, • 1n 
relation to historically constituted (and overdetermined) 
material actualities. And these interests are themselves 
already complexly overdetermined by material (cultural and 
psychological) factors. Given that interests can seldom be 
characterized as either fully rationalized (for instance, 
they may stem f~om profoundly held prejudices), and are 
almost never systematically consistent as a whole (one 
interest may conflict with another held by the same 
person/group), • meaning, even in a specific context, is 
almost always problematic. 
Both deconstruction, and a marxism grounded • 1n 
Marx's early works, see a complexly overdetermined 
, 
relation between ideas and the material world in which 
they are situated. What both approaches applied together 
reveal is that, while material realities produce and 
reproduce our • consciousness and modes of thought, our 
5 
material realities are themselves continually produced and 
reproduced by the very ideas that idealists constantly 
call upon as reflecting that reality and consequently 
being evidence of its essential existence. If we believe a 
condition in the world is natural and certain, and act 
towards it • 1n accordance with that belief, then the 
likelihood of its changing is lessened, giving us all the 
more ''reason'' to go on believing it is natural and 
I certain. Such reasoning needs to be thoroughly 
interrogated. 
Marx, in The German Ideology, sought to discredit the 
universalist claims of a specific metaphysical philosophy, 
early 19th century German idealism. Here, he lays the 
groundwork for taking apart idealism's claims of empirical 
objectivity in its desciptions of conditions in the world, 
conditions which idealists see as "given direct from all 
eternity, I I remaining ever the same." Marx seeks to 
undermine the validity of the idealist view of the world, 
and he does this by showing that even some of the most 
concrete and mundane things in the world, that idealists 
seek to interpret I 1n essentialist terms as 
things-in-and-of-themselves, are products of historically 
specific practices and relations. Marx attacks the 
6 
idealism of Fauerbach on the basis that he: 
terms 
•.. does not see how the sensuous world 
around him is not a thing given direct from 
all eternity, remaining ever the same, but 
the product of industry and of the state of 
society; and, indeed, in the sense that it 
is an historical product, the result of the 
activity of a whole succession of generations, 
each standing on the shoulders of the 
preceding one, developing its industry and 
its intercourse, modifying its social system 
according to the changed needs. Even the 
objects of the simplest 'sensuous certainty' 
are only given him through social development, 
industry, and commercial intercourse. The 
cherry-tree, like almost all fruit-trees, was, 
as is well known, only a few centuries ago 
transplanted by commerce into our zone, and 
therefore only by this action of a definite 
society in a definite age it has become 
'sensuous certainty' for Feuerbach. 
McLellan, ed. Selected Writings, p.174. 
Idealism's tendency to see phenomena in our world 
of sensuous certainties implies that what 
• in 
• 1S 
knowable of a thing, its "meaning," is a quality inherent 
to it: a cherry-tree I 1S a cherry-tree and it is best 
accounted for in terms of its cherry-treeness. Such a view 
of the world is partially a consequence, and partially a 
cause, of idealism's attempts to account for it in "pure" 
speculative terms that abstract things and relationships 
out of their overdetermining context. This attempt to 
describe the world in pure speculative terms is made 
I in 
7 
.. 
order to create a body of knowledge that is constituted of 
what idealists claim are empirically verifiable objective 
statements. For idealists, therefore, knowledge is the 
process of uncovering the knowable, which is an inherent 
quality of things. 
As a consequence of their program to "uncover'' 
objective knowledge, idealists tend to reject those 
readings of the world that declare themselves to be 
"political" or "ideological" as being based • in 
"value-judgements" which are defined as being relatively 
meaningless • ,in • comparison with the statements of 
"universal empirical truth'' that idealists attempt to 
generate from their philosophical systems. However, if, as 
Terry Eagleton states so succinctly in Literary Theory, 
"Interests are constitutive of our knowledge, not merely 
prejudices which imperil it" and consequently "The claim 
that knowledge should be 'value-free' is itself a value-
judgement'' (p. 14) , then ''meaning'' is therefore a 
contingent index of the p~ceived usefulness of a 
statement to a specific person or group of people in a 
specific setting. We can only describe our world 
meaningfully in terms that have relevance, and have 
developed in response to, human needs, relations, actions, 
8 
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and decisions. By failing to acknowledge this, idealism 
suppresses the historical and political particularity of 
the claims to universality that it makes as the validating 
basis for the objectivity of its own system of thought and 
of its own system of values: idealism's attempt to present 
the world in pure, speculative terms hides the values 
behind idealism -- in other words, idealism itself has an 
ideology which is hidden. 
In largely abstract terms, throughout The German 
Ideology, Marx attempts to show how much ideas and 
philosophical systems of ideas are dependent on the 
"action o_f a definite society in a definite age." Marx 
goes on in The German Ideology to describe how the 
idealist thought of any particular age is connected to the 
interests and practices of the ruling economic class, 
The ruling ideas are nothing more than the 
ideal expression of the dominant material 
relationships, the dominant material 
relationships grasped as ideas; hence of 
the relationships which make one class the 
ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its 
dominance. 
Selected Writings, p.176. 
By obscuring the fact that the real 
overdetermined construction of particular forn1s 
9 
• 1s an 
and 
. ;,. ' 
conventions of material relationships, idealism's 
uncritical, descriptive attempt to present the real as 
essential and ''given" tends to produce a theoretical model 
of the hegemonic as itself ''given.'' The consequence of 
idealism's suppression of the constructedness of reality 
is that, as Frank Lentricchia claims, it allows the 
hegemony to function as "fundamentally a process of 
education carried on through various institutions of civil 
society in order to make normative, inevitable, even 
'natural' the ruling ideas of the ruling interests" 
(Criticism and Social Change, p. 76). That 
• 1S, the 
idealistic and the hegemonic are involved 
• 1n a 
bootstrapping operation of mutual validation: idealism 
validates, in logocentric terms, the attachment of 
hegemonic values to the valued terms in a logocentric 
system, which in their turn validate the ''truth'' of 
idealism's "reflection" of the real, and so on. This 
process is quite circular. On the basis of Lentricchia's 
account of this process, we can understand the full force 
of Marx's claim in The Communist Manifesto, where he 
connects idealist thinking with the ideological program of 
capitalism, that the bourgeoisie "creates a world in its 
own image" (p. 84) and that its ''very ideas are but the 
,, 
outgrowth of the conditions of ... bourgeois production 
10 
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and bourgeois property'' (p.99). For Marx, the 
bourgeoisie's ''selfish misconception'' is its inability to 
admit to the contingent nature of its own conditions of 
existence. This leads it as a ruling class to ''transform 
into eternal laws of nature and of reason, the social 
foims springing from [its] present mode of production and 
form of property -- historical relations that rise and 
disappear • in progress of production -- this the 
misconception [it] share[s] with every ruling class that 
has preceded (it]" (p. 100) • 
In claiming that they seek to produce knowledge of 
that which is universally true, that they are above 
political ideology and that the statements they make are 
interest-neutral, idealists are also caught in,a "selfish 
misconception." What they are really doing is reproducing 
the conventions of knowing, the ways in which things can 
be known, institutionalized by the hegemony within ~he 
conventional academic setting-that has produced in the 
first place both conventional knowledge (ie. the things 
which can be known), and, simultaneously, conventional 
knowers (traditionalist, idealist intellectuals). Barbara 
Herrnstein Smith describes the process: 
11 
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.t) 
••• by providing them [idealist academics] 
with ''necessary backgrounds,'' teaching them 
''appropriate skills," "cultivating their 
intellects," and generally ''developing their 
tastes," the academy produces generation 
after generation of subjects for whom the 
objects and texts thus labeled do indeed 
perform the functions thus privileged, 
thereby ensuring the continuity of mutually 
defining canonical works, canonical 
functions, and canonical audiences. 
contingencies of Value, p.43-4. 
Idealists denegrate the attacks of politically 
aligned intellectuals upon "universal truth," as attempts 
to trivialize, popularize, or politicise knowledge. 
However, the programs behind the creation of bodies of 
i 
knowledge that are intended to serve the specific purposes 
of certain groups with an ideological agenda (for example: 
marxist, gay, or feminist readings of "Western history'') , 
reveal a clear awareness on their part of the function of 
knowledge as a thing that is produced and reproduced for 
certain purposes I 1n certain situations. such a 
self-conscious awareness of the role of ideology in the 
production of knowledge validates these groups' committed 
attempts for bringing about a change in those very 
"sensuous certainties'' that Marx has revealed to be 
constructs rather than givens. In attempting to suppress 
such attacks on ''universal truth, '' ideal ism's own (hidden) 
12 
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• 
agenda must be interpreted as supportive of the hegemonic 
status quo and hence inherently conservative in nature. 
However, that political conservatism is the ideology of 
idealism is a thing that is not easily apparent because 
idealism is so caught in producing and reproducing the 
very conventions and ''sensuous certainties" of the 
hegemonic culture. The idealist, canonical tradition in 
thought, like political conservatism, or the economics of 
laissez-faire capitalism, is a social construct and not an 
a • • priori, "natural" • given. All are systems of 
relationships controlled and maintained by human action 
and intervention in the world, which attempt to pass 
themselves off as natural systems. The bodies of knowledge 
/\ 
created by idealism are as much purposive constructs (in 
that they serve to naturalize as • given a system of 
production and reproduction of reality that is chosen) as 
are those of declared ideological accounts of things. The 
"universal truths" of meaning in the "canonical tradition 
of Western culture" are no less ideologically programmed 
than the contents of a trades union library on the history 
of labour relations. But the hegemonic, not drawing 
attention to how it permits the existence of the idealist 
intellectual and the products of idealist intellection, by 
default appears to ''naturalize'' them. 
13 
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The apparently passive, apparently apolitical work of 
idealist thinkers, for whom a "selfish misconception'' can 
be seen as a mainstay of their philosophy, is ultimately 
revealed to be an active involvement in conditions that 
require and perpetuate the political and intellectual 
exclusion or marginalization (in a word, repression) of 
the mass of supporting the I view people, by the that 
institutionalized notions of culture amount in some way to 
"Culture'' and the values they uphold are uni versa!. 
Idealist philosophies grow out of what is hegemonic • 1n a 
culture's expression of its sense of the "sensuous 
certainty'' of the world it has largely created. Hence, 
idealist philosophies are always fundamentally both 
products and validators of ideologies that are politically 
conservative in terms of that hegemony. In terms of the 
production of the particular hegemony of canonical, 
traditional thought within university English departments, 
which marginalize women's, black, gay, "third world,'' and 
proletarian writing, Frank Lentricchia explains the 
process like this: 
The fact that a document has survived and 
become a part of tradition is always under-
stood passively and hence retrospectively 
by the traditional intellectuals who 
produce, select, and constantly reselect 
what is to be celebrated by the honorific 
14 
tetm ••tradition.'' What the traditional 
intellectual tends to ignore, hide, or be 
unaware of, is his own active work of 
tradition-making, which causes ideas to 
survive through time, to become part of 
the transhistorical myth he calls ''Western 
Culture and Tradition.'' 
criticism and social Change, p.126. 
Given Lentricchia's view of the specific role of 
traditional, canonical thinking within literary education, 
which can be generalized to describe the role of idealism 
within all aspects of the institutional sites of education 
of a hegemonic culture, we can define idealist thinking 
and thinkers as functions and functionaries of a 
conservative ideology, ie. of an ideology that seeks to 
reproduce itself and which is hence inherently repressive 
to the modes of thought of ideologies that run counter to 
it. Ideological conservatism employs idealism to operate 
as the philosophical basis validating its • repressiveness. 
Idealism hence has a clear and particular application in 
the service of ''naturalizing" the • sovereign power of 
political • regimes that tend toward authoritarian 
totalitarianism. 
As Michael Ryan argues in Marxism and Deconstruction,, 
the deconstructive critique of metaphysics proves useful 
15 
for marxism, for it reveals that idealist philosophical 
systems attempt to ground themselves (and hence ground 
their ideologies) upon certain words, which are taken to 
have some form of essential meaning, such as ''right,'' 
"truth," or •1 law. 11 By taking such words as these out of 
their specific contexts of use, and by devaluating their 
opposites as the negative terms in a binary opposition, 
idealism elevates them to have ''universal'' applicability 
in deciding the right or wrong, truth or untruth, legality 
or illegality of any situation. By showing how metaphysics 
must always exclude a certain term, value, idea, or group, 
"so that another can be safeguarded internally and turned 
into a norm'' ( p. 3) ' deconstruction reveals ''the 
ideological nature of intellectual enterprises that give 
themselves out to be rational, scientific, axiomatic, and 
self-evident'' (p. 3) • 1 In his introduction, Ryan shows 
how, using Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan as an example, "it is 
possible to see the sort of metaphysical operations which 
deconstruction attacks at work as political ideology'' 
(p.2), thus demonstrating the operative connection between 
philosophical idealism and conservative liberalism. Ryan 
shows how, in Hobbes's model of an absolutist political 
system, the attempt to give words definitive • 1S 
. . 
meanings 
an important and repressive political act. Hobbes attempts 
16 
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to suppress metaphor, because metaphor can be used to 
undermine the absolute essential meanings that need to be 
assigned to words in order to define the laws supporting 
and extending a sovereign power. For Hobbes then, words 
with fixed meanings can be said to have a ''sensuous 
certainty'' that allows for the creation of a defined body 
of "knowledge'' on the basis of which laws can be issued 
''in an unequivocal language that excludes all possibility 
of ambiguity of intention or interpretation" allowing for 
the "absolutist political concept of a sovereign who 
represents the whole state and who is the unique source of 
laws whose authority is incontestable" (p.3). But 
authority can only be "incontestable" if there are 
literally no terms by which it can be contested. 
Consequently, Hobbes's concern with the maintenance of 
sovereign authority in a state requires the suppression of 
metaphor in order to control the possibility for language 
to be used to seditious ends to subvert the absolute rule 
of law. Metaphor must be suppressed in the Hobbesian 
system because the metaphorical capacity of language holds 
the power to disrupt rigidly signifying relations between 
words and the things they are meant to represent, leaving 
the door open for language users to reorient their 
conceptual relation to their world, thus making any 
17 
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already established relationship contestable. 
That the signifying power of words in a defined 
context • 1S always contestable has further ramifications 
for Hobbes's philosophy. As with all 
metaphysical 
political 
systems, Hobbes's idealist logocentric 
attempt to employ a language formulated in terms of words 
with essential • meanings can only be fulfilled by hiding 
("theorizing away") the differentiality and metaphorical 
displacement of its own terms, for order is precisely a 
subversion of subversion as metaphor is a displacement of 
the placement of meaning. As Ryan makes clear, Hobbes's 
conservative political philosophy rests upon and 
intimately bound (up in a "metaphorical displacement": 
For what is the "Leviathan," the analogy 
between the state and a natural being, but a 
metaphor? "For by art is created the great 
Leviathan called a Commonwealth, or State, 
in Latin Civitas, which is but an artificial 
man." 
Marxism and Deconstruction, p.4. 
• 
' IS 
The essentialist view of sovereign (absolute) power 
subverts itself in its reliance on the subversion of 
subversion, proving ~that no form of sovereign power can be 
fundamentally , unquestionable, no 
• 
sovereign really 
18 
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urepresents the whole state" wholly -- absolute power 
cannot be absolute. Analagously, coming down from the 
heights of abstraction to the mundane, day-to-day 
"realities'' of life under capitalism, take a recent 
financial commercial that, as part of its representation 
of the world, posits an essential American quality in its 
appeal for why people should invest with Citibank, 
"Because Americans want to succeed, not just survive." 
Such a statement represses an important fact in the real 
nature of economic or managerial success: for someone to 
succeed, others must necessarily fail. For example, 
American I companies involved in the maquilladora industry 
in Mexico are able to produce at a profit because they pay 
their Mexican workers as little as 20% of the I I minimum 
going hourly rate for domestic labour. The consequences of 
this for both Mexican and domestic workers can hardly be 
ter1ned "success." By sending capital to Mexico, in order 
to succeed in the "free market'' on cheap labour and 
undercutting the • price of· production at home and 
elsewhere, some Americans are already ''succeeding" by 
forcing other Americans out of jobs and into "failure." 
Hence, for Americans, even for those that do "succeed," in 
Citibank's • meaning of the word, success can hardly be 
defined as an essential (self-defining) state. And, in the 
19 
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case of maquilladora, success depends on failure.
 
Characteristically, conservative intellect
uals 
believe that epistemological truths exist o
utside of 
historical and material conditions, ·and indepe
ndent of 
human control and choosing, forming a give
n, natural 
order to things. Consequently, it is in their int
erests to 
define bodies of knowledge and control the 
• meaning of 
words: note at this point how E.D.Hirsch is obse
ssed with 
listing terms which are "essential" for students 
to know 
if they are to be culturally literate in their 
''national 
culture;" note also how Allan Bloom 
teaching canonical "great books." 
• 1S obsessed with 
In so doing, such 
intellectuals reject the views that claim the real nature 
of values exist ''in the variable encounters of 
intention 
and response in specific situations" (Marxism and 
Literature, p,157). Idealists claim that they reject such 
a view of values because it is relativistic and w
ould lead 
to the destruction of all values (order). But this is not 
so, as Nietzsche was so well aware. The destr
uction of 
belief in the ''given'' naturrc--of a particular orde
r brings 
about conditions for the reassertion of a new cho
sen order 
-- and all orders are chosen. 
20 
currently, with the aid of metaphysical thinking's 
account of the world, capitalism is being permitted to 
become an increasingly intolerant and totalitarian 
conservative hegemony. There is a neat alliance between 
capitalism and idealist thinking, as capitalism itself 
depends for its continued existence and power on hiding 
the real nature of its own modes of production. Capitalism 
produces surplus capital through the exploitation and 
marginalization of workers, and defends this by laws, 
conjured from nowhere, which it "naturalizes" • in 
"precedent," that defend the "right" of businesses to make 
a profit and to own property (capital). There • is a 
particularly pressing need for intellectuals to question 
the ''naturalness" of this order, to engage themselves with 
responsibility for the chosen, constructed nature of order 
(reality) • in our world, 
marxism's materialist 
and to 
critique 
align 
of 
themselves 
reality 
with 
under 
capitalism. Michael Ryan argues that the search for a new 
political order must incorporate deconstruction, in order 
to be self-critical, on the grounds that "the elimination 
of domination (sexual, political, economic) cannot occur 
completely without the transformation of the categories 
and the thought processes that sustain and promote 
domination" (p. 212) , on the basis that ''The reproduction 
21 
of contemporary capitalist society is tied not simply to 
specific categories (of thought], but to the very way we 
categorize" (Maraiam and Deaonatruation, p.117). The only 
escape from such a process of reproduction is through the 
constant reinterpretation of those categories and a 
questioning of their ''naturalness." 
With the preceding discussion of the ideology, and 
general theoretical limitations, of idealism in mind, I 
will now turn to examine particular instances of the 
failings of idealist thinkers in modern American academia 
to come practically (as readers and writers) to terms with 
questioning the "real'' nature of our world, and their role 
within it. I will begin, as my point of departure, by 
taking a close look at a universalizing statement by 
E.D.Hirsch. 
22 
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Notes: 
I 
I 
1. A further value of deconstruction that extends from 
this, and that has particular relevance to the thinking of 
critical marxists, is its ability, in a reading of Marx, 
to draw us away from the temptation to which some marxists 
(what Ryan calls "crude" marxists) succumb through their 
(perhaps overly literal) reading of Das Kapital, to ground 
the marxian account of the production of cultural reality 
• 1n a material base which precedes a cultural 
superstructure. By distrusting the crude determinism of 
such a model of reality, we are brought back to a 
re-reading of Marx's work that emphasises his earlier 
writing, particularly The German Ideology, the program of 
which, like deconstruction, simultaneously ''designates a 
state of things in materiality" while it "advocates a 
critique of substantialism" (Marxism and Deconstruction, 
p. 8·). 
23 
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Chapter 2 
Idealism and Academia: 
The Politics of Reading: B.D.Rirsch and Allan Bloom 
Whenever you find a doctrine of 'nonpolitical' 
esthetics affirmed with fervour, 
look for its politics. 
Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives 
Given the popularity of the work of E.D.Hirsch and 
Allan Bloom, and the continuing forum for the ideas o
f 
promoters of the canon and the Western tradition in moder
n 
American academia, does this then mean that Marx wa
s 
wrong, and that idealist thinking has stood the test o
f 
time because it is a truly universalist system of though
t 
that does account sufficiently for abiding, universal
, 
and natural conditions of human existence and transcend
s 
the particularities of history and place? From the
 
argument of my first chapter, evidently this is not the
 
case. It would seem rather that the material and
 
historical evidence suggests that the influence 
of 
idealism- in modern America is the result of American
 
capitalism having largely brought about conditions in the
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••sensuous world'' so that its thinkers can interpret them, 
as Feuerbach did, as "sensuous certainties.'' Consequently, 
the claims of thinkers such as Hirsch and Bloom concerning 
••universal truths'' need to be questioned minutely by 
critical thinkers to uncover what they hide of historical 
particularities, and to uncover the ideological 
implications of this. 
In Cultural Literacy, E.D.Hirsch draws a "universal" 
meaning from Mason L.Weems's sacharine fable of George 
Washington and a cherry-tree. In his discussion of Weems's 
story, Hirsch talks of how some of "the most persistent 
elements of our national lore owe their longevity to human 
universality rather than conscious political design,'' and 
how this story "in the most charming possible way, 
persuades young people to tell the truth" (p.89). I want 
to show here how Hirsch's "universalist" reading of this 
story is but one interpretation among many, and a pretty 
uninspired one at that. I will try to demonstrate that the 
tale will bear a wide range of interpretations, and to 
uncover how particular material conditions and ideological 
interests are inscribed within it -- particular conditions 
and interests that Hirsch appears oblivious to, and unable 
to name as such, because he takes them for granted as 
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"sensuous certainties." Consequently, Hirsch's 
universalist reading of this story plays a thoroughly 
ideological role, ''naturalizing'' specific values which 
have been constituted in relation to particular historical 
conditions, by failing to point out the ideologically 
inscribed particularities of this constitution. Hirsch's 
reading of Weems's tale, far from providing an adequate 
account of what is universal about it, reveals itself to 
be grounded in an uncritical acceptance of conditions and 
relations that are thoroughly dependent for their 
existence on 
production. 
capitalism and capitalist 
George, said his father, do you know who 
killed that beautiful little cherry-tree 
yonder in the garden? This was a tough 
question; and George staggered under it 
for a moment; but quickly recovered him-
self: and looking at his father, with 
the face of youth brightened with the 
inexpressible charm of all conquering 
truth, he bravely cried out, I can't tell 
a lie, Pa; you know I can't tell a lie. 
I did cut it with my hatchet. 
modes of 
First, in a purely formal respect, if you reduce the 
act of this story out of its scene (to use Kenneth Burke's 
terms) you end up with something like this: ''a child was 
'' 
caught in an act by his father and admitted to it.·,, Not a 
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thrilling scenario, unless we read in to it the moral: 
''his father rewarded his honesty, and, by learning the 
value of honesty, the child won the respect of others and 
eventually became a great hero.'' But we can only manage to 
abstract the "moral'' out of a reading of this tale if we 
bring something to our reading of the text: an 
understanding of the symbolic value of the idea "George 
• Washington, 11 a symbolic value which 1s more or less 
culturally specific to • Americans at a certain point in 
their history (ie. after the Revolutionary War). 
The basic • premise of causality • 1n Hirsch's 
interpretation of the action of this tale, that it 
''persuades young people to tell the truth," is revealed 
here as questionable at best, for it is to assume that 
these young people ought to understand the significance of 
the symbol and agree upon its value (perhaps, for American 
Indians, among others, the example of Washington would 
rankle). At worst, Hirsch's premise that the story 
persuades young people to tell the truth • 1S a patent 
logical absurdity. A reader might consider the potential 
. range of ''morals" that might be drawn from this tale 
involving truth telling, in the light of consequences that 
may reasonably follow from its basic scenario, but which 
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both Hirsch and Weems would claim it excludes. This tale 
only tells us, given that the character George Washington 
is for readers a symbol already inscribed wi~h meaning 
even before they read the tale, why it was valuable for 
him to tell the truth given his father's response. It 
doesn't tell us why it is universally valuable to tell the 
truth in the first place at all. If we weren't talking of 
George Washington the historical figure and relating this 
story to what we know of his history (or what Americans 
know of history as winners of the Revolutionary War), it 
would make equally good sense, and provide an equally 
applicable warning on the general dangers of telling the 
truth if its scenario was the same ("a child was caught in 
an act by his father and admitted to it"), but the 
histo~ical details of Washington's life after the event 
were different, for instance: "his father shot him dead on 
the spot." The moral of this might very reasonably be 
1· --
that, "the child has been considered an incredible fool 
ever since for not lying." As such, out of the schoolroom 
setting of a stable, bourgeois·society, it would serve as 
much better advice on the potential value of lying for, 
say, French resistance fighters, especially if we 
substituted another historical figure, Adolf Hitler, for 
Washington's father. And, for George Washington ,,the 
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military commander, truth telling would hardly serve as an 
effective tactic in the fight to win American 
independence. The relation between the meaning, form, and 
substance of this tale is far more unstable and elusive 
than Hirsch suspects. And, he fails totally to pick up on, 
and reflect over, the interesting fact that this story • 1S 
quite untrue: he never considers the perplexing 
implications of a "universal truth" being conveyed 
through, and grounded I in, an apocryphal story. Surely, 
something more than universal truth is in operation here. 
On a rhetorical level, beyond the formal aspects of 
the tale, Hirsch fails to identify what gives the scenario 
its particular animation, what allows it to take on a 
particular meaning in the specific context of the symbolic 
power of "George Washington." Beyond the bare bones of 
form and symbol, this tale consists of particular choices 
of words that work together to form a patch-work of 
specific value-judgements, namely, and with specific 
reference to little George: the ''toughness" of his 
father's question, the "quickness" of George's recovery 
from it, the ''sweetness" of his face, and the ''bravery'' 
with which he answers. Once we identify the words that 
give the symbol its animating moral context, that direct, 
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or persuade us into a particular reading of the formal 
narrative of this tale, this story begins to display 
itself as very clearly a piece with a ''conscious political 
design.'' Weems is, after all, talking about the historical 
figure, George Washington, and not just any child, and 
assigning to him specific qualities, not just any 
qualities. Unless we believe that Weems had no control 
over what he was doing in the writing of this tale, that 
it coiled out of his mind as some sort of mystical 
revelation from an all-knowing God, then we have to read 
it not as an expression of some mythic universality, but 
as a clear piece of myth making about a certain historical 
figure who played a clear political role. How can Hirsch 
fail to see this distinction? Either he is seeking to hide 
Weems's myth making rhetoric or he is totally persuaded by 
it. In either case, by claiming the tale owes its 
longevity to ''human universality,'' Hirsch is uncritically 
transcribing Weems's ideology to his readers, and 
persuading them of its ''naturalness.'' Weems's moralizing, 
establishing a connection between little George's honesty 
and Washington's heroic success, simply does not provide 
the conditions for a necessary sequence of events, and 
would not form such a sequence even if the scenario of the 
tale was an historical fact. Consequently, if this tale 
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persuades its readers in any way, then it is in the 
acceptance of a fallacious logic. 
In his search for universal meaning in this tale, 
Hirsch also fails to identify and discuss the work and 
value of the specific thingly elements of its scenario's 
... 
"material'' scene. The cherry-tree (we recall Marx's 
critique of Feuerbach here) is an import from the Far 
East, and hence itself in this place a consequence of 
capitalist imperialism (precisely what the Revolutionary 
War was fought over). Also, both little George's hatchet 
and the garden itself are products of human labour. 
Without the invisible presence of a proletariat, a forever 
anonymous artisan iron-monger who crafted little George's 
hatchet, without the historical development of trade which 
brought the tree to • America, without the ships that 
brought the white, Anglo-Saxon Europeans in the first 
place with their complex reasons for coming, without the 
paper on which Weems wrote, made from trees felled and 
pulped by anonymous workers, where would poor little 
George be and what would he be doing? And, unless we can 
see George as situated in a recognizably real world, then 
on what basis can Hirsch justify our seeing his fictional 
mode of action as viable for application within our own 
31 
lives as real people? Why does Hirsch say nothing of how 
the fictional George Washington is already placed in, and 
the meaning of his actions overdetermined by, a setting 
fully inscribed and ordered by capitalist practices and 
modes of production? The fact is, Hirsch's reading is 
actively involved in the wholesale erasure of vast areas 
of human experience from history, compounding an identical 
erasure already at work within Weems's text. 
Weems, if we can judge by his own gloss on this 
story, is mentally a combination of the two 
I 
maJor 
tendences of thought in 19th century, post-Enlightenment 
America. I His mind once and • 1S religiously at 
rationalistically inclined, for he wants his story to 
serve as a model for every youth to become ''a Washington 
in piety and patriotism, -- in industry and honour'' 
(Cultural Literacy, p.89). As such, the scene of Weems's 
tale is very much a product of the main intellectual 
dialectic of its time. The garden setting for this tale 
can then be reasonably seen as a function of the 
post-Enlightenment mind-set, a fictional setting with 
significance for the particular conventions of a certain, 
historically specific, mode of fictional discourse. The 
garden is a combination of both the Christian and the 
) . 
.... 
3.2 
Enlightenment views of the world: it is the con
ventional 
scene of the Edenic fall from innocence a
nd gaining of 
knowledge. George is an Adamic figure str
ipped naked 
before the all-seeing eye of his father; 
the garden is 
also the conventional scene of 18th century p
astoral, the 
meeting of the natural (childhood) and the ration
al 
(reasoned action). 
Given George Washington's more pragmati
c than 
mystical role in the material course of his
tory, perhaps 
• 
the rationalistic conventions gain the upper 
hand in our 
interpretation of this tale in the light of 
the knowledge 
we bring to our reading of it. And, given wha
t we know of 
the real reasons for why people do certain
 things, we 
would be more than justified in looking for intentionality 
and motivation in it if we are to take the 
moral of this 
tale a~ a guiding star in relation to which 
we ought to 
decide our own actions. Very reasonably, 
we might be 
inclined to ask why does George act as he does,
 why does 
he tell the truth. Given this, it is hardly 
any wonder to 
us then that George, in response to his fathe
r's question, 
'' staggered under it for a moment. 
11 It would make more 
clear sense in ter1ns of our pragmatic, 
rather than 
chivalric, cultural values, to interpret thi
s fable • in 
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relation to the rationalistic motives of the types of 
characters who individuate themselves in relation to and 
in terms of capitalist forms and practices. Instead of 
dwelling on little George's ''bravery,'' we ought perhaps to 
focus on this "staggering'' hesitation. By this shift of 
emphasis, we are able to see George's final telling of the 
"truth" not as the result of an essential, ideal 
truthfulness on his part, but a pragmatic consideration of 
the consequences of telling the truth or lying, a 
hesitation under the opposing impulses of the desire to 
tell the truth and the desire to avoid pain. George could 
be said to be evaluating the potential ''cost" of telling 
the truth. If we say this, then we give George a motive 
for telling the truth that makes sense of the scenario of 
the tale in terms of an albeit schematic, but identifiably 
realistic, motivated person in motivating circumstances. 
If George can be said to be evaluating, or 
conunodifying, the consequences of truth-telling here, then 
perhaps it would not unreasonable to read the tale in 
terms of a capitalist moral economy, especially given the 
tale's historical context. We could say that George has 
discovered that, like cherry-trees, truth is a commodity 
to be divided up and parcelled out, bought or sold, a 
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thing which produces consequences like the tree produces 
fruit, or wood, and as such a thing that is reduceable to, 
and usable as, a piece of private, bourgeois property. 
Such a reading of the tale would, I think, constitute a 
pretty extreme interpretation, but it would nevertheless 
be more convincing and no less question-begging than 
Hirsch's and Weems's own interpretations that claim George 
tells the truth because it is universally valuable to tell 
the truth. If the tale can be said to mean anything, and 
if it is to make any sense, it demonstrates that 
truth-telling can be used for certain purposes in certain 
circumstances. In this circumstance truth-telling has this 
purpose. 
Even such a fundamentally ahistorical approach to 
this story as that which might be provided by a 
pychoanalytic perspective can be used to shed a more 
revealing light upon it than Hirsch's interpretation. 
George's act might be interpreted thus: his cutting down 
of the tree can be seen as a final fling at playing the 
fort/da game, the final parting from the mother, and a 
symbolic act of castration. Through his felling of the 
tree, George is making himself the possessor of phallic 
power, preempting and usurping the power of his father. 
His telling of the "truth" in this instance is the
 first 
sign of his power over the symbolic -- the father 
cannot 
un-fell the tree, but George can "charm'' him w
ith the 
''budding'' of a power that is ''all conquering.'' By
 doing 
something ''wrong'' here, by chopping down th
e tree, George 
is training for the day when he will grasp
 the reigns of 
power. He has immaturely broken the law of own
ership of 
property (the law of Truth, as truth is constructed u
nder 
capitalism), an action that is to permit him in maturity 
as a General to break the law of George II
I, and to 
establish as a President a new, chosen reign of l
aw (hence 
the martial terminology that describes his "all-co
nquering 
truth"). Such an ahistorical interpretation of the tale, 
not permitted in Hirsch's simplistic view of its
 meaning, 
accounts for the one aspect of the tale that al
l of its 
readers, wno also know the myth of Washington, 
know that 
I 
I 
I 
Weems • tfrying to persuade us of: this tale is 
presenting 
1S 
I 
I 
Washingt n heroic figure. It 
• elevating as an lS an 
histori al individual out of history and into the
 realm of 
an idealist, national mythography. In 
the most 
propagandist fashion, Weems's tale is doing id
eological 
work, or if it is not doing that work first han
d, in the 
sense of producing it (as Washington was already a 
''hero'') , then the tale is very clearly reproducing it. 
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The lesson that history tells critical readers of 
this tale is that the fictional George has appropriated 
truth for his private ends in terms of a historically and 
ideologically specific vision of the world, not that his 
action is a function of human universality. So too is 
Weems's tale, as a text considered rhetorically rather 
than hermeneutically, revealed as an appropriation of 
"truth" for certain ends in a certain context. Rather 
than being an instance of the value of telling the truth, 
the tale is in all respects either or both a shining 
example of the value of cunning and sophisticated lying, 
and of the power of idealism to reproduce an already 
fabricated fiction (the mythic accretions around the 
historical figure of Washington). That George's act can be 
seen from another perspective as a simple • piece of 
vandalism, something that fits uneasily alongside the 
supposed qualities of "the inexpressible charm of all 
conquering truth,'' and that Weems's tale, beyond being a 
piece of the most asinine and hollow moralizing, • 1s an 
attempt by the author at self-aggrandizement, are 
possibilities totally elided in Hirsch's 
of the web of meaning in our world. 
rarefied • • v1s1on 
Both E.D.Hirsch and Allan Bloom, who talks with an 
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almost pathological obsession about "the law,'' "spiritual 
••• choices," "our souls," and, when he speaks of 
teaching, ''real teachers," are representative of thinkers 
who want to extend the influence of ''traditional'' American 
values in a society that they claim is in crisis, yet both 
use examples that show that the ''universal" and the 
"traditional'' hide within them the specific concrete 
materialities that have produced them during certain 
historical periods. As Walter Kendrick states, "Bloomian 
'eternal truth' is less than a century old." The fact is, 
what is traditional is a retrospective construction. 
Bloom and other conservative intellectuals see the 
truth-claims of idealism as currently under threat, and 
The Closing of the American Mind is a contemporary 
jeremiad that responds to that supposed threat. 1 But 
Bloom's moral crusade to save "our souls" is a misguided 
one. By wanting to place crisis as opposite and external 
to social order, he fails to entertain the possibility 
that crisis is as symptomatic of the production of order, 
as poverty is symptomatic of the production of wealth. 
Consequently, one basic problem of his critique of the 
role of ideas in education may lie in the very sense that 
we are in a crisis now. While Bloom correctly identifies 
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crisis in part as connected to the present form of 
capitalist democracy in America, wishing to return to a 
static golden age, he fails to entertain the possibility 
that crisis is an endemic condition of conservative states 
in general because they, like Hobbes's Leviathan, create 
the conditions which so-called seditious and revolutionary 
sub-cultures need in which to flourish. Bloom overlooks 
this, failing to see crisis as a necessary creation of all 
conservative states (one of which the United States 
already is), rather than the liberal anarchy that he seems 
to visualize the United States to be at present (although 
Bloom's argument is so confused it is difficult to know 
exactly what he does believe). Bloom identifies I I cr1s1s 
narrowly as having its root in the erosion of ''natural" 
beliefs (p.26-7), beliefs that for him find their 
practical, living articulation in rationality, industry, 
honesty, respect of the law, and maintenance of the 
nuclear, patriarchal family. He never considers that 
crisis is perhaps an inbuilt consequence of the attempt to 
limit thought to these categories, and that by 
reproducing them we reproduce the very conditions for 
generating the "crises" that appear to undermine them . 
. The naivety of the approach of cultural conservatives 
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to the teaching ot ideas, that is to education in the 
humanities, lies in their belief that the mind is an empty 
vessel to be filled and history is a collection of given 
facts with which to fill it. Bloom argues for the canon, 
Hirsch argues for national culture. But there is little in 
either of these arguments to suggest a belief that 
education should be any more than a form of 
indoctrination, rather than a truly transforming and 
liberatory experience, for both ask students to be passive 
in the face of an active process that involves them. In 
Hirsch's case, he argues that national languages and 
cultures have evolved and therefore we must learn them. 
But who is to say that they do not go on evolving, and 
that in the course of time become subverted by the 
languages of sub-cultures who refuse to accept them? 
Hirsch's certainty that the history of the development of 
culture and language stops at the national level is one 
way of ensuring their continuance in this form. In other 
words, the argument of Cultural Literacy doesn't reflect 
how language is in our culture, but • 1S one more choice 
made in the process that allows it to go on as it is. For 
Bloom, that canonical thinking's purpose • is one of 
indoctrination (although he seems~unaware of this) becomes 
clearest when he expresses· a ret1urn to the ''great books" 
'--,, ' 
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as his solution to the "crisis in education'' at the 
universities, a crisis which he identifies as manifesting 
itself in a lack of ''intellectual excitement'' (p.343): 
Of course, the only serious solution is the 
one that is almost universally rejected: 
the good old Great Books approach, in which 
a liberal education means reading certain 
generally recognized classic texts, just 
reading them, letting them dictate what the 
questions are and the method of approaching 
them -- not forcing them into categories we 
make up, not treating them as historical 
products, but trying to read them as their 
authors wished them to be read. 
The Closing of the American Mind, p.344. 
Virtually every word in this paragraph • 1S question 
begging, and many readers will object to it for diverse 
reasons. But the • main problem of Bloom's educational 
scheme here is that it allows no room for theoretical 
endeavour that articulates a clear ideological stance if 
''great books'' must not be treated as ''historical products" 
or forced into ''categories." But, despite Bloom's implicit 
claims to the contrary, all books are clearly historical 
products, and their authors always speak to us from 
categories of one form or another. Bloom requires this 
exclusion of history and ideology in the process of 
reading, presumably, because of a belief in the ability of 
educators to • arrive at an unbiased and disinterested 
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compilation of universal truths. By closing off a whole 
area of cultural endeavour from analysis through a whole 
range of critical perspectives, Bloom would encourage 
dogmatic indoctrination, for he would close attempts to 
recognise that our lives aren't set within a great 
universal given. Indeed, Bloom's scheme would encourage 
precisely the closure of the American mind rather than its 
• opening. 
Surely, if there really was such a thing as that 
which is essential, timeless, and universal, then it would 
hardly need to be attended to. Human effort put into its 
maintenance would be, by definition, wasted effort. What 
would be the point of looking after that which will look 
after itself? For instance, Bloom's claim for the value of 
Plato's dialogues, that "What is essential about • • • 
[them, and what] is reproducible in almost all times and 
places • • • [is that h]e and his friends can think 
together" (p.381) describes a human experience so general 
and commonplace that it can hardly serve as an incentive 
to guide our critical faculties towards an in depth study 
of Plato. It is with the transient material contingencies 
and historical immediacies of our lives, that we feel most 
intimately concerned and to which we must tend our 
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energies. And, in relation to these, "it is the special 
function of theory, in exploring and defining the nature 
and the variation of practice, to develop a general 
consciousness within what is repeatedly experienced as a 
special and often relatively isolated consciousness'' 
(Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, p.212). It is 
precisely this role of ideologically motivated theory, the 
• 
generation of a general consciousness, that canonical 
thinking itself accomplishes, but uncritically, 
undialectically. 
Overall, there is immense danger in Bloom's idea that 
texts should be just read. Such a process of cultural 
consumption encourages readers (thinkers/ students) to be 
uncritical and risks putting them undescriminatingly into 
the control of ideas. And this process of uncritical 
consumption can be encouraged especially by writers and 
teachers who consider themselves to be in a privileged 
position from which ideas can be contemplated 
• in 
detachment and isolation from their historical contexts 
and consequences. For, language in general, and written 
artefacts in particular, just are not the neutral media 
that Bloom seems to believe they are: 
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Language is not a pure medium through which 
the reality of an event or an experience or 
the reality of a society can 'flow'. It is 
a socially shared and reciprocal activity, 
already embedded in active relationships, 
within which every move is an activation of 
what is already shared and reciprocal or 
may become so. 
Thus to address an account to another 
is, explicitly or potentially, as in any 
act of expression, to evoke or propose an 
active relationship to the experience being 
expressed ... 
Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature, 
p.166 
Such a view as Bloom's, that "great books" can be 
"just read" is illusory idealism of an extreme kind. In 
common with other modern idealist thinkers, there • 1S a 
ideas desire • 1n to • raise thinking Bloom's 
(writing/history/literature/knowledge/thought itself, or 
whatever category you choose as a label), to the status of 
a solitary fetish divorced from the vicissitudes of 
historical reality. The university becomes a shrine for 
worship of the secular "mystery'' of Knowledge, before the 
Truth of which students are expected to swoon ecstatically 
like Eloisa. Certainly, you can ''just read'' • Mein Kampf 
passively as its author wished it to be read, but is this 
a desirable practice? And is such a practice free from 
ideological involvement and consequences? And is the 
practice to ''just read'' The Republic, The Declaration of 
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Independence, or Martin Luther King's Letter ~roa 
Birmingham Jail any less open to suspicion than such a 
reading of Mein Kempf? Can we safely assume that, because 
King's politics were radically different from Hitler's, 
his rhetoric hides no drive for power? To all these 
questions the answer must be no, or at least not exactly, 
because a passive reading fails to account for the active 
nature of the text. In a word, such an "educational'' 
approach risks repressing its students. 
Canonical thinking reveals itself to be the 
intellectual equivalent of colonialism, offering as "great 
works'' the intellectual products of one part of a culture, 
and elevating these products to the status of Culture 
while excluding the products of the culture at large from 
inclusion under this category. For this reason, a piece of 
bourgeois culture like Puccini's La Boheme, concerned with 
the tragic plight of a working class seamstress, 
• 1S 
considered to be more a part of Culture than, say, a 
broadside ballad like The Cotton Lords of Preston (lyrics 
reprinted in Nature and Industrialization) of the same 
period. The reasons for the fame of La Boheme and the 
anonymity of the broadside ballad are far too complex to 
go into exhaustively here, but I hazard a guess that the 
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opera's audience, from the 19th century to the present, 
has been largely composed of bourgeois canonically 
educated to value this product of their own class in terms 
of its ''universal theme" of the "human condition.'' By 
contrast, if The Cotton Lords of Preston is valued by the 
members of the class that it was intended for (who are 
only likely to come into contact with it through academic 
research), then it is probably because it is seen as an 
historical source on early 19th century working conditions 
in the Lancashire cotton industry -- which of course it is 
with its lyrics of "If we don't get the 10%" in contrast 
to La Boheme's sentimentalizing, "Your tiny hand • 1S 
frozen." No doubt, Bloomian guardians of Culture would 
denegrate attempts to elevate The cotton Lords of Preston 
as a subject of academic study as being ideologically 
motivated. Consequently, working class people today can, 
if they so wish, listen to La Boheme on public radio, see 
it performed at the Metropolitan Opera, or buy a recording 
of it on compact disc, record, or tape; they may even see 
~ 
it performed on a cable-T¥ station, and they will be able 
~(_ 
to find much written on it, but they will hardly have such 
easy access to The cotton Lords of Preston. It • 1S 
interesting to note how proletarians are excluded from 
easy access to the history of the intellectual products of 
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their own class, which tell of their class experience in 
terms of specific struggles, and yet offered in its place 
such abundant access to the traditional products of the 
ruling class, which, if they deal with working class 
experience at all, abstract and reframe it • 1n 
sentimentalizing, universalist terms for consumption by 
mainly bourgeois audiences. 
Bloomian idealized culture is nothing but bourgeois 
culture, class culture, alienating to those individuals 
for whom that culture does not constitute an immediate 
social reality. In Bloom's account, Walkman • wearing 
business students (one of his examples of all that is 
wrong with modern life in his chapter on the evils of rock 
music), are deaf to the culture of the "great tradition'' 
while tney are wired for sound: 
... as long as they have the Walkman on they 
cannot hear what the great tradition has to 
say. And, after its prolonged use, when they 
take it off, they find they are deaf. 
The Closing of the American Mind, p.81. 
And yet, the investment of these people in the production 
and reproduction of culture in corporate capitalist states 
is part of the process that allows the modern university 
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and the modern university intellectual to exist, and that 
indirectly maintains Bloom's ''great tradition.'' 
Multinational business corporations, like Sony (radios) 
and CBS (tapes), often have a considerable involvement in 
the business programs of the modern university, and their 
products are often the result of ''soft'' applications of 
the developments of corporations involved more deeply in 
the ''hard'' end of the military-industrial complex, like 
General Electrics (field communication systems) or IBM 
(the computer products used in defense systems), companies 
who are themselves deeply involved in the scientific and 
industrial programs offered by universities. To quote an 
impressive statistic from James Ridgeway's article, ''God 
and Mammon at Harvard," describing the extent of corporate 
involvement in academia, in 1984 "A Harvard Watch survey 
of 444 of the 500 largest U.S. industrial firms ... found 
that academics held 360 directorships among those 
companies.'' Much as Bloom attacks the MBA program, which 
he calls "a great disaster'' (p. 369), it is only within 
this setting that the modern humanities department exists, 
with the responsibility of rounding off the skills and 
acculturating the up-and-coming generation of managers and 
technocrats. • Given this, evidently the study of a 
depoliticised and universalized canon, which Bloom 
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believes will counter the values of big business, is 
precisely the "educational" route that corporate 
capitalism requires university humanities departments to 
pursue in the service of its own best interests, a route 
which conveniently avoids addressing the very questions 
about culture that would uncover the true operation and 
historical development of the power of the bourgeois 
class. 
The very type of culture and writing that depends 
upon the privileges of certain socio-economic conditions 
that permit the existence of the criticism and teaching of 
cultural artefacts by a cultural elite, as self-sufficient 
and separate from political questions and issues, depends 
for its existence on the absence -- in fact, the denial 
(sometimes by military force; how many U.S. universities 
made money out of the Viet Nam war?) of those privileges 
for the bulk of the people who come into contact with that 
culture, whose • energies are consumed mainly • 1n the 
struggle to maintain the necessities of physical and 
social survival. Most people under capitalism neither have 
the leisure nor the education to come into contact with 
what Bloom calls culture, and what (ironically) is only 
maintained through the surplus value of their exploited 
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labour -- they provide the work that provides the basic 
needs of intellectuals: books, writing paper, pens and 
pencils, classrooms, computers, 
housing, clothing, and so on. 
electricity, 
The production 
food, 
and 
dissemination of one book involves a diverse group of 
people in a complex process of production that does not 
require any who are involved in any one area of that 
production to necessarily have any knowledge or interest 
in those concerned in another area. In fact, shared 
knowledge and interests, a fundamental condition for the 
political association of labour, is a thing actively 
discouraged by the management class and conservative 
politicians. Such a strategy, employed in labour relations 
and labour legislation to weaken the power of trades 
unions, forms an interesting parallel to the intellectual 
division of labour implied by Bloom's demand that great 
books be just read, "not forcing them into categories we 
make up, not treating them as historical products.'' This 
is an indication that for Bloom the division of 
intellectual labour is aimed at weakening the influence of 
ideological critiques of culture and writing. Bloom has a 
clear political agenda. 
The production and consumption of literature does not 
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just involve authors and readers. The whole process of 
production and consumption (particularly in an 
institutional setting) is complexly overdetermined. If 
Bloom had to provide even a fraction of the things he 
takes for granted by his own labour he would no longer 
have time for intellectualizing. Furthermore, the 
complexities of international capitalism mean that perhaps 
many of the people who labour to allow Bloom to do what he 
does aren't even marginally connected to what he calls 
culture. Perhaps many actually belong to venerable 
cultures of their own. Meanwhile, their I experience, and 
its cultural I expression, is denegrated by Bloom as 
secondary to the culture 
, 
that their work invisibly 
supports. As with Weems's tale, and Hirsch's reading of 
it, the work of a whole class of people is written out of 
history by Bloom. Given these things, it would seem 
appropriate that materialist intellectuals address the 
ideological implications of their intellectual endeavours, 
and define a position counter to that of cultural 
conservatives in the dialectical process of history, the 
constant rhetorical struggle which is the writing and 
reading of history. 
All the same, such a view of education does not 
51 
, 
. ~ 
detract from its purpose of bringing people to a state of 
understanding the dominant culture. Indeed, many readers 
who strongly disagree with Bloom and Hirsch, like myself, 
will find themselves having to accept one basic tenet of 
their arguments: to educate people we must begin 
somewhere. In the preface to cultural Literacy 
quotes Samuel Johnson: 
There is no matter what children should learn 
first, any more than what leg you should put 
into your breeches first. Sir, you may stand 
disputing which is best to put in first, but 
in the meantime your backside is bare. Sir, 
while you stand considering which of the two 
things you should teach your child first, 
another boy has learn'learn't 'em both. 
Hirsch 
Such a view does not imply we abandon the hegemonic 
culture that surrounds us. Rather it implies that we must 
pay particular attention to that hegemonic culture because 
its operation is deeply involved in our history, deeply 
involved in making us what we are, and that a radical 
rupture from it is effectively impossible. But, as Maria 
Margaronis argues in her Village Voice article ''Waiting 
for the Barbarians, '' ''the question is not whether one 
should know the dominant culture, but how one should know 
it" (p.16). And, as Lentricchia argues in criticism and 
Social Change, "a revolutionary culture must situate 
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itself firmly on the terrain of its capitalist antagonist, 
must not attempt a dramatic leap beyond capitalism in one 
explosive, rupturing moment of release, must work its way 
through capitalism's language of domination by working 
cunningly within it, using, appropriating, even speaking 
through its key mechanisms of repression'' (p.24), for 
"the radical mind has no privileged mode of persuasion 
available to it, there • lS no morally pure, no 
epistemologically secure, no linguistically 
uncontaminated route to radical change" (p.34). In this 
context, and in the interests of bringing about change, we 
need to attend to the role of canonical (idealist) 
thinking critically to uncover its ideological work. 
One of the prime sites for the promotion of idealist 
thinking • in the modern • American university 
I is the 
ubiquitous Freshman Composition course, offered by nearly 
all the I maJor state and private institutions throughout 
all fifty states. I believe that the type of freshman 
texts used for Freshman Composition courses promote the 
same suspect notion of history and culture as Bloom et al, 
especially rhetorical modes anthologies and great ideas 
anthologies. J In fact, the type of education Bloom 
recommends already has an ubiquitous presence in 
• American 
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universities. As I'm writing this thesis at Lehigh 
University, and as our students, so homogenous in terms'of 
their economic and cultural background and so resistant to 
the challenge of ideas, seem to be precisely the affluent, 
Walkman wearing infidels that Bloom is so keen to attack, 
I will pay particular attention to the anthology we've 
used for four years to show precisely how ineffective 
canonical, idealist thinking can be in engaging and 
confronting students with the complexities of real 
thought, especially when historically influential ideas 
are taught in universalist terms. Consequently, I will now 
turn my attention to A World of Ideas, to reveal the 
workings of its hidden ideological agenda, with particular 
\ 
reference to its handling of The communist.Manifesto, to 
show how the idealist program of its editor works to 
subvert the ideas of Karl Marx and his own criticism of 
idealism, and to reveal how its emphasis on the rhetorical 
style of Marx's writing is complicit in this subversion. 
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Notes: 
1. Jeremiads on the state of American culture have been 
around since the Puritan landing, and jeremiads on the 
state of what Bloomians like to call ''western'' culture 
have been around since its inception. 
·! 
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Chapter 3 
Idealism and Preahlllan Composition: 
The Politics of Freshman Anthologies 
.•. the authors (of freshman texts] know that writing and thinking interlock in perplexing ways, and they have some earnest things to say about writing as a "way of training the mind in logical thought" ... and as "the art of making up one's mind" 
... , but really the textbooks are about tidying up and transcribing thought, not thinking. 
Richard Ohmann, English in America 
A fair number of freshman writing programs in the 
United States base their courses around anthologies that 
emphasize the ''great ideas" of Western culture. Although I 
distrust the cultural bias of such ''great ideas'' 
anthologies, it is not my purpose to enter into that 
argument here. Unquestionably there is value in students 
understanding the nature of the institutionalized ideas 
of their own culture. 1 What I want to argue here is that 
in general, "great ideas'' anthologies, beside their other 
failings, fail even to do a decent job of presenting the 
ideas of so-called Western culture to their audience in a 
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genuinely constructive manner. 
Teaching the work of an influential thinker like Marx 
to freshman writers, who already hold prejudices hostile 
to his ideas, presents obvious problems. These problems 
are generally exacerbated by the way in which "great 
ideas" anthologies distort his work by insensitive editing 
and by inept introductory material. More pervasively they 
distort Marx's ideas by obsessively • persuasive elevating 
techniques over content, thus separating content from its 
historical context. For my present purposes, I wish to 
concentrate on the problems I have encountered with the 
presentation of The Communist Manifesto in the anthology 
we use on our freshman composition course at Lehigh, 
st.Martin's 1986 volume A World of Ideas edited by Lee 
A.Jacobus, which I believe is a fair example of its type, 
and to contrast its failings against the merits of a 
different type of anthology, an example of which is 
Oxford's 1977 volume Nature and Industrialization. Edited 
by Alasdair Clayre, Nature and Industrialization was 
designed for use as a reader for an Open University Arts 
Foundation course in the United Kingdom. Whereas Clayre's 
anthology stresses the dialectical nature of ideas as 
responding to historical and material conditions, 
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Jacobus's emphasizes the importance of suasive rhetoric 
and views ''great ideas'' from an idealist, essentialist 
standpoint. 
To begin, let us consider A World of Ideas in 
Jacobus's own terms. Jacobus's stated objective in A World 
of Ideas, tellingly subtitled: ''Essential Ideas For 
College Writers,'' is to introduce students to what he 
defines as the "significant ideas of our culture" 
(Preface, v) from Plato to the present day, that "extend 
their influence through time and beyond national frontiers 
to help unite us in a community of learning and awareness" 
(p.2). Examples of these significant ideas are ordered 
within sections according to discrete, institutionalized 
disciplines: Politics, Economics, Psychology, Philosophy, 
Religion, and Art (in that order). Marx's Manifesto • 1S 
presented in the section on politics alongside work by 
Machiavelli, Rousseau, Jefferson, Thoreau, Douglas, 
Stanton, and Martin Luther King. What Jacobus feels sets 
his text from other ''great ideas" anthologies, 
similar at least in their supra-historical ecclecticism, 
'I-.; 
and what on the surface certainly seems commendable, • 1S 
() ··~ his attempt to represent "every writer ... by as complete \__ ___ . -.. -, 
l ,d selection as 
', 
is practicable'' (v) • Jacobus seeks to 
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present full essays as opposed to one and two page 
excerpts; for, as he claims,· ''developing a serious idea 
takes time" (v). 2 Presumably, Jacobus's purpose in this is 
to respect what he sees as the integrity of each 
selection. However, Jacobus' s ''as complete . . . as is 
practicable'' proviso covers a multitude of sins, and the 
anthology abounds with editorial cuts which actually 
distort the nature of the ideas in many of the selections. 
In the case of The Communist Manifesto, where Jacobus cuts 
the whole of the section on ''Socialist and Communist 
Literature,'' such arbitrary excisions show that he has 
failed, even on his own terms, to respect or understand 
the integrity of the ideas before him. Above all else, I 
believe this failure is a consequence .of Jacobus' s 
emphasis on rhetoric. 
Take for example what Jacobus does with Marx's 
argument in the section "Proletarians and Communists," 
where Marx entertains the objections of a hypothetical 
bourgeois antagonist. The passage ends with Marx's 
statement that ''The charges against Communism made from a 
religious, a philosophical, and, generally, 
ideological standpoint are- not deserving of 
examination'' (para.116). Jacobus sees this 
! 
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from an 
• serious 
statement 
y 
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merely as part of a "fascinating rhetorical strategy'' 
(p.87) t~rough which Marx has "brushed aside" religion. 3 
However, to claim that this is a brushing aside, 
suggesting a rhetorical ploy to dismiss religion hastily, 
is to fail to give credit to the complex interweavings of 
Marx's argument, and it is to fail to acknowledge that 
Marx only makes this claim after establishing that ''The 
bourgeoisie has stripped of its halo every occupation" 
and converted, among others "the priest" into "its own 
paid wage-labourers.'' Jacobus seems oblivious here to the 
thrust of Marx's critique, which is aimed not at religion 
as such but religion as it has been appropriated by the 
bourgeoisie. After making his point about the charges 
against communism not deserving serious examination, 
Marx offers a substantial explanation of why this 
• 1S so 
which culminates 
I in the statement that "Communism 
abolishes absolute truths." Marx moves on to deconstruct 
the idealist nature of absolute truths in the third 
section of the Manifesto, "Socialist and Communist 
Literature,'' a section cut by Jacobus on the grounds that I 
it is ''the least important to the modern reader" . ) (p.86). 
It is in this ''least important'' section that Marx explains 
why bourgeois objections to his argument are illegitimate 
through his analysis of the appropriation, into the realm 
,, 
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of metaphysics, of the ideas of the French revolution by 
the German idealist philosophers. Without the benefit of 
this omitted section, Marx's statement, ''But let us have 
done with bourgeois objections to Communism'' is left 
contextually stranded and can be reduced to what Jacobus 
describes as a ''rhetorical signal.'' In reality, and in 
context, Marx's statement here is far more than a signal; 
it is a direct articulation of a complex argument that • 1S 
carefully developed throughout the Manifesto as the basis 
of its entire dialectical materialist conception of 
history. Jacobus misunderstands Marx's argument, and he 
misunderstands it because his concern is more with style 
than with content; a concern which is part and parcel of a 
bourgeois idealist view of history. 
Jacobus's violence to the substance of the 
materialist dialectic in the Manifesto, then, permits, or 
is permitted by, his emphasis on the presentation of 
''great ideas'' as examples of persuasive rhetoric. In 
general, the result of such an emphasis in an anthology 
like A World of Ideas encourages students in habits of 
misreading. By emphasizing persuasive techniques Jacobus 
tends to exclude an adequate historical context for ideas 
so that ''great ideas'' become situated in a mystical 
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context that is provided by other "great ideas.•• In such a 
context they come to be read as being about, not the 
purposes of their authors in response to certain specific 
historical conditions, but ''Human Nature ... , Man in 
general, who belongs to no class, has no reality, who 
exists only in the misty realm of philosophical fantasy.'' 
If my criticism here sounds familiar then it is because 
these are Marx's own words criticising the rhetoric of the 
Gezman idealist philosophers, taken from the third section 
of the Manifesto, edited out by Jacobus. Jacobus's 
presentation of the Manifesto, as a piece of rhetoric in 
the context of a section on "politics," and against other 
works unconnected with its immediate historical context, 
forces students towards an idealist reading that 
suppresses Marx's materialist dialectic making what 
remains of it after editing virtually unintelligible as a 
critique of idealism. 
Jacobus's obsession with rhetorical style reaches 
absurd heights when he claims, in his general introduction 
to the selections, that: "The most interesting rhetorical 
achievements of the selection are identified and discussed 
with an eye toward helping the student discover how 
rhetorical techniques can achieve special effects" (vii). 
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In preparing to read the Kanifeato we feel we are watching 
the opening credits for B.T. And of course, as many 
freshman wil). tell you, I.T. is ''about'' benign space 
aliens, the special effects occurring as consequences of 
the practices of those space aliens; neither do the 
' 
special effects result from, nor are they about, corporate 
practices and capitalist modes of production. And ''great 
ideas'' in A World of Ideas, spread thinly from Plato to 
Marx, appear to freshmen as two dimensional as do films at 
the Shopping Mall Cinecomplex. 
An overambitious attempt at providing h·istorical 
" 
"scope'' in an anthology • 1S self-defeating: it simply 
erases the dynamics of real history. Jacobus makes 
Thoreau, Jefferson, Machiavelli, Stanton, King and Marx 
into strange bedfellows. Their individual works, formed in 
relation to highly specific contexts, tend to lose 
concretion as a result of their unnatural proximity. We 
can easily establish tenuous, abstract connections that 
allow our students to interpret and judge the Manifesto 
in ''universalist'' ter1ns, but what concrete, specific, 
connections can be established to allow students to 
understand the Manifesto in its complexly determined 
specificity as a product of real history? Quite simply: of 
- .J: . 
·l 
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itself Jacobus's anthology provides no adequately 
sufficient context to aid a reader to an understanding of 
ideas in a way that is compatible with any genuine 
understanding of their relation to the real processes of 
human history out of which they are formed. 
Ideas, reproduced without an adequate context, tend 
to be seen as themselves "inadequate" in the minds of 
students who are generally not knowledgeable enough to 
provide such a context from their own limited 
consciousness of the details and processes of history. For 
them Marx is "off the wall," his ideas are simply seen as 
irrelevant to their notions of life in either the 20th, or 
the 19th, century because they have such limited 
geopolitical and historical awareness. If you are not 
aware of the horrific nature of the conditions of working 
class life in mid-19th-century Europe, and the reasons for 
those conditions, then you cannot understand why Marx • 1S 
so critical of the bourgeoisie. What context we are given 
by Jacobus, in the form of insufficient biographical 
background, ends up being irrelevant and destructive to 
any hopes of bringing about a better understanding of 
Marx's ideas. We are told that Marx "came into conflict 
with Prussian authorities because of his radical social 
• 
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views," but we are left in the dark as to what profound 
conflicts these views arose out of in the first place. 
Students, guided toward crassly simplistic psychoanalysis, 
come to believe from what details they are given that 
Marx's views grew out of a chip on his shoulder 
originating in the university position that was "denied" 
him. This denial ''forced'' him into journalism and then 
''abject poverty'' in London. The possibilities for such 
oversimplifications are added to in the Instructor's 
Manual for teachers, in which Jacobus states that "Most 
students are familiar enough with the author and title of 
this work that little preparative effort is needed before 
discussing what Marx has to say" (Manual, p.17). But what 
does it mean to be ''familiar" with Marx and the Manifesto 
if you know next to nothing of either the material 
conditions of life in 19th century England or the 
intellectual background of Marx's ideas? Marx, bearded and 
making off with private property in a jolly red swag-bag 
on a state owned reindeer, is little more than a sinister 
inversion of Santa Claus. 
The lack of an adequate historical context is the 
general failing of "great ideas'' anthologies. In A World 
of Ideas such a context is excluded primarily as a result 
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of Jacobus's emphasis on rhetoric. This raises a question 
with which A world of Id••• seems unable to engage: what 
has a recognition of the effectiveness of persuasive 
techniques to do with a recognition of the real historical 
value of ideas? Jacobus claims in his introductory 
chapter on rhetoric that: ''The authors whose selections 
are presented in this book have one important credential: 
they have changed the way people think" (p.1). But, so 
would a gallon of Budweiser. We all know about Ronald 
Reagan's • persuasive abilities -- from practical 
experience, particularly of his early speeches, we also 
know the extent of the greatness of his ideas. There is 
.. 
absolutely no sense in A World of Ideas, or in any similar 
"great ideas" anthology I have seen, that an idea always 
possesses a value contingent upon real conditions or that 
ideas are formed dialectically. such a blindness to 
overdetermination and process in the production of ideas 
is a characteristic problem that bourgeois academics have 
in dealing with the valued products of their culture; and, 
by closing a route for critical enquiry in the freshman 
composition class, its main product is the reproduction of 
bourgeois thought., 
There is then a desperately important need to present 
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ideas to our students in an adequate context, so that we 
may teach Marx effectively to his modern audience -- so 
that we can teach any ''ideas'' effectively. The need for 
radically new types of anthologies to replace the present 
''great ideas'' texts is clear, and models for such 
anthologies do exist. Consider the anthology used in the 
United Kingdom for an Open University Arts Foundation 
Course, aimed at students new to study at the 
undergraduate level. By contrast with A World of Ideas, 
Nature and Industrialization historically and • 1S 
culturally very specific. 4 The ideas of the last forty 
years of the 18th-century and the first sixty years of the 
, 
19th • 1n England are presented, with a reasonable 
acknowledgement of their antecedents and legacy. Nature 
and Industrialization certainly doesn't abandon the notion 
of great ideas and influential thinkers, presenting 
excerpts from the work of· "major writers," among them 
Marx, Smith, Arnold, Mill, Ruskin, and Carlyle. However, 
these are presented alongside an abundance of other 
contemporary texts, such as poems, excerpts from novels, 
letters to newspapers, broadside-ballads, parish records, __ 
proceedings of parliament and so on. Included are even 
selections instance, the • 1n dialects, local for 
experiences of farm labourers and city workers. Apparently 
., . 
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the editor, Alasdair Clayre, felt that such discursive 
sources, including sub- and counter-cultural ideas, have 
their place alongside ''great ideas,'' modifying them and 
modified by them. By contrast, Jacobus is openly hostile 
to sub- and counter-cultural ideas, claiming in his second 
edition of A World of Ideas to have "never intended" his 
new edition to be ''more trendy'' than the first. Jacobus 
leaves us virtually in the dark as to what qualifies as 
"trendy" beyond his V4gue, but brisk, refusal to include 
''current 'in' writers" (vi) . Evidently, the editorial 
policy of Nature and Industrialization is to demonstrate 
that it is of the very nature of ideas that they develop 
dialectically out of the full complexity of their 
interdetermined material and intellectual environments. 
The material conditions of life in the towns and country 
of mid-19th century England, and the intellectual 
background of that period, are sufficiently realized • 1n 
the selections to make quite clear that the ideas of 
19th-century social critics result from reasoned reactions 
to those conditions and that background. 
·~ 
In place of Jacobus's reductive disciplinary 
categorizations of ideas we have in Clayre's anthology 
interdisciplinary, but far more speci_fic, categories such 
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as: Nature and Romantic Literature; The Factory System; 
. Transport; The North and the Big City; Poverty, 
Unemployment and Protest; Poets on Work and Civilization; 
English Folk Songs and Industrial Songs. While in A World 
of Ideas Marx is presented only under the section on 
politics, here his ideas are presented ~n four different 
sections. And, while the bulk of anthologies in the United 
States, examples of which are legion, do at least arrange 
their selections in less rigidly orthodox categories than 
Jacobus's, historical context is still ignored by them and 
writers are still defined as being certain, unproblematic 
"types'' of thinkers by being relegated to single sections. 
Although the selections in Nature and Industrialization 
are diverse, its ecclecticism works to establish the 
dialectical nature both of ideas and of the identities of 
their ''authors" -- it works, in other words, to 
reconstruct the dynamics of real history. This anthology 
is also carefully focused on constructing a specific 
dialectical historical argument, the conflict between 
ideas of nature and of industrialization in England during 
the industrial revolution. students are introduced to a 
specific • in depth of debate developed an 
~nterdisciplinary context, without facile divisions being 
made between· ideas on the strength of pedagogic 
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"disciplines." There is an attempt here to recreate the 
dynamic experience of a culture, to present and define 
ideas as produced largely in response to the material 
< 
conditions and historical complexities of a specific time 
and place. In what other capacity could ideas be 
legitimately considered to have significance? 
I believe that an anthology like Natura and 
Industrialization is a viable model for what is needed to 
replace those of the A World of Ideas mold. In classes at 
Lehigh, I have, along with other teachers, attempted to 
bring the essays in A World of Ideas to life 
• • 1n various 
ways and had some reasonable success in getting my 
students to understand ideas as dialectically 
constructed. 5 But this is inefficient and uphill work. It 
would be useful to see a new generation of anthologies 
presenting influential writings of a specific era in a 
ready-made context. Although individual teachers may be 
able to make a text like A World of Ideas work with some 
reasonable adequacy, I am convinced that its effect 
• 1S 
generally counter-productive. Often I see the selections 
within it being taught, in true idealist fashion, as texts 
that are in some way self-sufficient to themselves and 
that address universal human • issues. ''Great ideas" 
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anthologies lend themselves to -- in fact they demand --
such an approach. However, this approach is 
intellectually facile and academically fraudulent. Given 
this, "great ideas'' anthologies of the A world of Ideas 
ilk that attempt to cover the "scope" of what is 
"important'' in ''human experience'' have no place in the 
classrooms of • serious academic institutions. In their 
place it would be heartening to see anthologies that 
concentrate on a specific topic • 1n depth, say: 
conservatism versus radicalism; authoritarianism versus 
liberalism; or corporatism versus socialism, and to set 
this in a specific historical and cultural context. 
Finally, we need to question the teaching of writing 
as simply a tool to persuade, as if suasive facility is 
what makes great communicators in some way equally great 
in terms of their ideas. The ultimate irony of teaching 
persuasiveness over critical judgement and • expressiveness 
over introspection is that we are turning out students 
equipped to trap themselves within an ideology, and 
confidently ready to impose their system of thought, 
half-baked, upon the world. In order to educate· our 
students we need to help them, not to defend, but to 
challenge their received assumptions about the world. You 
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cannot teach ideas that have arisen out of the 
contradictions and struggles of history to people who 
cannot recognise, and will not struggle with, the 
contradictions inherent in their own lives and beliefs. We 
should be turning out self-interrogating, questioning, 
critical thinkers, rather than self-satisfied, smug, 
con-men. 
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Notes: 
1. I do not discuss ''rhetorical modes'' anthologies in this 
paper. These seem to form the bulk of freshman readers. 
Generally I think that these anthologies share many of the 
problems of "great ideas" anthologies. And, even though 
they include sub- and counter-cultural selections, these 
anthologies still present ideas in a context that tends to 
suppress historical materialism and elevate the values of 
bourgeois idealism. However, given the great "diversity" 
of such readers they deserve a more thorough critique than 
I can offer in the context of my present focus. 
2. Ideas, for Jacobus, seem to share the same mystique in 
their • genesis as does a famous beer which the 
advertizements claim has ''matured slowly over beechwood." 
But, like another watery beer, the "silver bullet that 
won't slow you down," Jacobus's description of what goes 
into the making of an idea is decidedly lite, reductive in 
its exclusivity of other factors and more likely to 
produce quantities of stale air than a mind-altering 
• experience. 
3. Why does Jacobus make the singular claim that Marx 
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dismisses religion in this line? He appears to be 
misreading badly here, oblivious to Marx's claim that 
religion and philosophy can be embraced as manifestations ) 
of ideology in general. 
4. Of course, it might be objected that the Open 
University Arts Foundation Course is not a writing course. 
However, the Arts Foundation Course is concerned with 
preparing students for writing at the undergraduate level. 
Unlike other British universities, the Open University 
stipulates no formal academic entry requirements at the 
foundation level. To qualify prospective students must 
simply be British- and over eighteen years of age. The 
course is writing intensive, requiring the submission of 
nine 1500 word essays over a period of nine months. The 
early assignments are ·discipline based, the latter ones 
interdisciplinary. 
5. When teaching the Communist Manifesto in the fall 
semester of 1988 I used Engel's description of Manchester 
from The condition of the Working Classes in England, 
1844-5 (from Nature and Industrialization), together with 
articles on the maquilladora industry in modern Mexico 
(from newspapers, magazines, and other sources, of the 
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political right and 
\ 
left). ) These provided an effective 
• 
context for demonstrating the reality of the conditions 
the llanifeato refers to, relating them to capitalist 
practices, and showing their historical development. 
75 
Chapter 4 
Tb• Politic• of Writings 
Persuasive Rhetoric va. Involved Rhetoric 
In the absence of a basis in the actualities of the 
,. I 
which • is ostensibly material world, idealism, 
find absolute outward-lookJ.,ng, seeking to I meanings for 
things that occur within the day-to-day vicissitudes of 
the mundane, universal • meanings that transcend those 
arising out of the immediate historical context of that 
mundanity, increasingly displays a tendency to become an 
inward-looking aestheticism, justified in terms of its own 
self-definition, divorced from a recognition of its own 
involvement in the world. The consequence of this 
aestheticism for ·the teaching of literature and 
composition is an emphasis on "style" as an extractable 
essence in the written. The danger of this in the teaching 
of writing lies in notions of ''rhetoric'' as something 
divorced from conditions and consequences, notions that 
recognise nothing except the power to persuade, so that 
, 
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the product of academic writing and thought is the 
generation of a debate which, "of the most restricted 
academic kind, is precisely an argument abstracted from 
history and from the lives of the participants. You can 
argue either side of the 'case.' And there are no 
consequences" (Richard Ohmann, English in America, p.156). 
The problem in American freshman courses at the 
moment is the emphasis on persuasive rhetoric, which as 
Richard Ohmann argues works against students' abilities 
for critical thinking: 
Argument divorced from power, money, social 
conflict, class, and consciousness is pseudo-
argument ... but perhaps pseudo-argument is 
good training for entry into a society with 
pseudo-politics . . . ~--
English in America, p.158. 
How many freshman composition topics begin like this, 
"argue for or against . . . , '' as opposed to "consider the 
problem of 
historical 
• • • • '' 
If you disconnect rhetoric from 
realities, then you end up with an 
oversimplified rhetoric, a pseudo-rhetoric that supplants 
real thought with pseudo-thought, where rhetoric 
• 1S 
divorced from considerations of its attendant 
consequences, contradictions, and social responsibities: 
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••• the student is almost invariably conceived 
of as an individual. He acts not only outside 
of time and history, but alone -- framing ideas, 
discovering and expressing himself, trying to 
persuade others, but never working with others 
to make a theme that advances a common purpose. 
Bngliah in America, p.149. 
In its attempt to establish the importance of ideas 
as things in themselves, idealism • in fact denies a 
connection between ideas and the material world, thus 
appearing to disconnect thinking, and writing as well, 
from an involvement • in, and a responsibility for, 
conditions in the world. This makes thought and writing, 
seen as merely means whereb_y information about the world 
is conveyed ''neutrally,'' tools for t.he transmission and 
~ 
reproduction of any hegemonic ideology that has a vested 
~ 
interest in the consequences of such a disconn.ection . 
Given that, • in Lentricchia's words, "Form • 1S a 
relationship of manipulation between a text and an 
audience -- a relationship ... in which power is, in the 
same moment, given both its birth and its point of 
application" (Criticism and Social Change, p.89), 
persuasive rhetoric taught as such is the ''perfect" 
compliment of consumer capitalist modes of material 
production and reproduction, 'for it is essential to 
advertizing which • 1S capital's ''ideal'' medium of 
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expression. As John Berger claims of advertizing in Waya 
of Seeing, publicity "recognizes nothing except the power 
to acquire." Advertizing is purely persuasive rhetoric, 
and part and parcel of the ideological process by which 
corporate capitalism today disguises its real nature, its 
dependence on tricking consumers into buying its 
''products, " while 
(corporate profit). 
disguising 
Advertizing 
its real end product 
• 1S 1 like "Today's 
Chevrolet," "The Heartbeat of America.'' But Chevrolet's 
message about its cars is empty, doing nothing to address 
issues of material consequence relevant to the buying of 
cars, issues of economy, reliability, comparability with 
other cars, or of the environmental and social 
consequences of a high per capita private ownership of 
automobiles. But, the question is, do we want our students 
to write and argue like this, engagingly but hollowly? And 
is it really in the long term interests of corporate 
capitalism if consumers come to accept advertizing 
rhetoric as a neutral way of representing reality, and to 
see ,advertizing promises as the answers to the most vital 
' J,,v .· 
choices they have to make in their lives? 
Some people believe that 
" 
class repression can be 
undermined by teaching students • persuasive rhetoric 
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because this is a tool that will allow them to free 
themselves from such repression thereby bringing about 
. ' 
conditions for egalitarian change in our society. But, 
believing that such a co-opting of persuasive rhetoric for 
egalitarian ends will necessarily bring ·about those ends 
of itself is naive in the extreme, for alone it aliows ( 
students to escape from repression only by enabling \hem 
to repress others. Such a view of rhetoric and writing 
does not challenge the basic mechanisms of I repressiveness 
at the heart of our culture, nor does it challenge the 
prop for t~at, the notion of the self-sufficient, 
' 
self-identical, essential and uncontradictory bourgeois 
individual. And, the maintenance of the illusion of 
essential individuality is but a way of obscuring class 
interests. 
J' 
The danger of the conservative, idealist approach to 
education is that because it treats knowledge as a form of 
intellectual capital -- for example, by categorizing some 
literary texts as canonical -- it always fulfils the needs 
of the categorizing class (the needs of authority) over 
those of the generality of individuals. As Marx claims in 
the Manifesto, • 1n ''bourgeois society capital 
I 
1S 
independent and has individuality, while the living person 
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is dependent and has no individuality" (p.98), and the 
same state of affairs is true for intellectual capital in 
the institutions of modern capitalist societies. (In 
America universities have been established to fulfil the 
needs of capitalism, funded as they are by the federal 
government, corporations, donations from wealthy patrons, 
and the fees of students taking courses with the object of 
securing high paying jobs within corporations at the end 
of their degrees.) But knowledge capital, perhaps even 
more than specie capital, is a construct, dependent on 
human actions and choices for the form and value of its 
construction. Idealist thinkers like Bloom and Hirsch are 
seeking to make knowledge capital into the exclusive 
private property of one class. And, as law is the means by 
which the current inequalities in the relations of various 
classes to economic capital are given social legitimation 
in our culture, schooling • 1S the means by which the 
inequalities I in the relations of I various classes to 
intellectual capital i~egitimated. The alliance 
canonical thinking and political conservatism, and 
between 
between 
persuasive rhetoric ~and the dominant mode of discourse 
under capitalism, permits such an underhanded 
appropriation of knowledge. 
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Such an alliance exists in the academy at odds with 
the notion of education as a questioning, liberatory, 
progressive social process. In this way education under 
capitalism generally works against the aims of further 
education embodied in the objectives of humani·ties 
doctoral programs, with their emphasis on critical 
thinking. And, education under capitalism increasingly 
works against the furtherance of social democracy. An 
I 
idealist education, where the role of intellection is to 
reflect reality without forcing it into ''categories we 
I 
make up, 11 without treating it as an ''historical product, 11 
is merely a tool for the dogmatic imposition and 
maintenance of a totalitarian political order. 
Education's position then is a dialectical one. 
Because of the inevitability of the process of cultural 
reproduction as a con.sequence of cultural practice, 
education is necessarily a prime site of ideological work. 
In common with all other cultural practices, education's 
role • is one in which social realities are mediated 
(because education intervenes in the process of their 
reproduction) rather than being simply reflected. We 
cannot learn Truth through education, but we can reproduce 
existing truths or learn how to question them, and we can 
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learn how to construct new truths. We do not ''learn'' 
Knowledge in any enabling sense of the term; we can only 
be indoctrinated with it -- but we can learn the process 
whereby knowledge is made. In a democratic society, the 
university ought to be concerned with bringing about in 
its students the capacity for the production of knowledge, 
not the inculcation of ''facts.'' Because the role of 
education in this process is always partial (other factors 
are always involved), its status as ideological work is 
consequently problematic. Necessarily, then, education's 
social role is not a fixed and given thing existing 
outside of an historical context, but is rather a thing 
that must be ''fixed" and appropriated by human agents in 
relation to their specific needs in an ever changing 
historical process. The relarlon of education to these 
needs must always be kept open to questioning. 
Within the process of the ideological work that 
education does at present, the almost Jubiquitous 
requirement for the teaching of freshman English at 
colleges and universities looms large, and, necessarily, 
the ideological tensions that are part and parcel of the 
operation of education as a social force should be writ 
large within it. Howev~, the teaching of freshman English 
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is seen by most university administrations, by most 
students, and by most of its practitioners as somehow , , 
something removed from ideology, and concerned with 
composition, writing, as a kind of primal exercise of the 
''mind,'' through some strange, shamanistic conjuring away 
of writing's own very vital role as itself an 
ideologically inscribed reproducer of culture. Some might 
seek to deny that this is the role of writing, but we can 
dismiss such a denial immediately because it denies a 
cultural significance to writing, and hence also 
(ironically) to ideas. And, as we can dismiss such a 
denial, it necessarily follows that materialist teachers, 
concerned with education as a real force for social 
democracy and enlightenment, must expend their time and 
energy in engaging and deconstructing the arguments of 
; intellectual idealists who believe that · .. the social role of 
' I , 
education is simple and straightforward. 
--
•• 
j 
In order to educate our students in an enabling way, 
we must help them to deconstruct the ''naturalness" of the 
/ 
\ 
realities they • perceive about them and as part of 
themselves. At the moment we are doing little beyond 
indoctrinating them, as Richarcf'-Ohmann so cogently argues 
of the English profession in general in his book English 
t 
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in Aaerica, a volume which responds to what he identifies 
as a crisis in literacy and literary culture in America. 
Although this book was written in 1976, little has changed 
• 
in either the ubiquity of the composition course 1n 
colleges, or in its importance as a means of producing a 
certain academic product: 
We train young people, and those who train 
young people, in the skills required by a 
society most of whose work is done on~aper 
and through talk, not by physical labor. We 
also discipline the young to do assignments, 
on time, to follow instructions, to turn out 
uniform products, to observe the etiquette 
of verbal communication. And in so doing, we 
eliminate the less adapted, the ill-trained, 
the city youth with bad verbal manners, 
blacks with the wrong dialect, Latinos with 
the wrong language, and the rebellious of 
all shapes and sizes, thus helping to 
maintain social and economic inequalities. 
Most of these are unwilled consequences, 
and, since they also run counter to the 
egalitarian ideology of the larger culture, 
it is not surprising that the English ~ 
department fails to point them out when) 
justifying its pay" (p.230). ( 
' \ 
Here at Lehigh, in common with the situation at other 
universities, freshmen are permitted, in accordance with 
the requirements of sd"-called "freedom of thought" to 
pursue idealist thinking, and the consistency in form and 
' substance of freshman anthologies aids- in this process by 
default. This, together with the activE!l~elllphasis on 
r 
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persuasive rhetoric over critical writing (that is, the 
type of writing which is involved with generating 
dialectical conflict and interrogating ideas), provides 
.. 
students with a ready-made ideological prison and the 
tools to build a smaller ideological prison inside it, 
bourgeois individualism, from which they are encouraged to 
interpret the enclosed space outside of the smaller prison 
as an area for the operation of ''freedom. '' 
If universities are to carry out the real job of 
educating people for entry into a fully democratic 
society, and if that society is to flourish as a dynamic 
totality of competing ideologies, then teachers need to 
help students to constantly question the day-to-day 
realities of life in that society. We need to stress to 
. 
students in English composition that words, texts, and 
ideas are not static ''things" in use or ''objects" • 1n 
contemplation, but inseparable elements of dynamic 
cultural processes. Rhetoric, in other words, needs to be 
taught as a thing involved in the production and 
reproduction of social realities. The aim and emphasis of 
teaching an "involved'' rhetoric should be to reveal the 
relations between material conditions, language/words, and 
ideas, to demonstrate the fact that ''The production of 
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ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first 
directly interwoven with the material activity and the 
material intercourse of men, the language of real life.'' 
(The German Ideology, p.164). Students should be equipped 
to identify and interrogate the social role of idealist 
thinking. Some might ask: ''Can business and capitalism • in 
America afford the risks of such a subversion of their 
ideology in the universities?'' Well, can they afford the 
·-. 
risks of an Oliver North or a Pat Robertson as president? 
The fact is, the university is responsible for generating 
and reproducing the society we live 
responsibility as an educator, not 
• 1n, so it has a 
necessarily for 
overturning for qu~ioning it 
,-. 
the order, rather 
unceasingly in an effort to make our world a better and 
more tolerable place and to keep our culture free from 
ideological ossification. 
To fail to align your teaching politically, to refuse 
( 
to offer critiques of capitalism's ruse to pass itself off 
as a natural order, is to make yourself the tool of that 
ruse: to become an indoctrinator rather than an educator~ 
't 
' 'To exist socially is to be rhetorically aligned. It • 1S 
the function of the intellectual as critical rhetor to 
uncover, bring into the light, and probe all such 
' 
. ,.., ,.' 
87· 
..... 
I 
• 
alignments." (Critioi•• and social Chanqe, p.149). If 
education is a site in which values are necessarily 
produced and reproduced, then those within it ought to be 
critically self-conscious of their ideological role. 
Finally, of course, this paper itself is a piece of 
persuasive rhetoric, and I must echo Frank Lentricchia's 
words at the end of criticism and social Change. In the 
dialectical struggle with idealism the fate of materialist 
philosophies 
democracy, 
such • as marxism, and the fate of social 
..• will be decided by the active 
involvement of individuals in the great 
struggle of persuasion. To say this about 
the fate of socialism, that it will be 
decided in rhetorical war, is to say 
nothing especially specific to its vision. 
The fate of all visions, or nightmares, 
as the case may be, of the good life, will 
be similarly decided. 
"Decided'' is too weak: "chosen." (p.163). 
-
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Conclusion 
Perhaps the contribution of Lehigh professors to the 
• improvement of education should be to turn out an 
interdisciplinary anthology that achieves what • 1S 
required. Here is a suggestion: the Reagan years: 
radicalism versus conservatism. 
... 
/ 
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.,. 
• career 1.n 
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